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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1978
MERLIN G. BRINER*

INTRODUCTION

F

EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS:

1978 is the sixth of an annual

series of articles to be published in the AKRON LAW REVIEW. The scope
of this survey is limited to the substantive developments in the field of income
taxation. The thrust of this article is not only to identify new developments,
but also to trace these concepts through their formulative changes.
Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the practioner
in this field to remain current with the changes which have occurred during
the year. Research of this article includes cases decided through January
1, 1979. The Revenue Act of 1978 will be covered in the winter issue of the
AKRON LAW REVIEW.

In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and publication, this author has engaged the most able assistance of several members
of the AKRON LAW REVIEW. Without their substantial contributions and
complete dedication, this article would not have been possible. The author,
therefore, wishes to recognize and thank the following members of the
AKRON LAW REVIEW, for their efforts in researching, writing .and compiling
this article: Timothy D. Carnahan, Gregory L. Petersen, Linda L. Robison,
Michael P. Swanson and Michael R. Stith.
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LOO
LO1

Income
Meal Allowances
Two major questions concerning the taxability of meal allowances have
been answered in recent Supreme Court decisions: 1) whether or not Section
1191 allows exclusion of cash meal allowances furnished by an employer
when the employee is required to be available for duty during meals; and
2) whether or not reimbursed meals or meals furnished by the employer on
the employer's premises are subject to withholding under Sections 3401 (a)'
and 34021 and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act.
In Commissioner v. Kowalski," the Supreme Court held that a cash

meal allowance paid to a New Jersey state trooper was taxable income within
the meaning of Section 61 (a),' and was not subject to exclusion by Section
119. The Kowalski decision overruled previous decisions allowing the exclusion under the "convenience of employer doctrine."' The Court stated
that Congress' enactment of Section 119 was specifically directed toward
limiting exclusions for meals to those furnished by the employer, and not
cash reimbursements. Additionally, Section 119 excludes only meals furnished on the business premises of the employer. Although not necessary
for the Kowalski decision, the Court seems to have limited the "convenience
of employer" wording of Section 119 to mean necessary to allow an employee
"properly to perform his duties."'
In Central Illinois Public Service Company v. United States," the Su-

preme Court held that reimbursement of lunch expenses of employees on
non-overnight company travel did not constitute wages subject to withholding
by their employer within the meaning of Section 3401 (a). The employees
were repairmen for a utility company who were given cash reimbursements
for lunch expenses if they ate at the work location. The Court stated that,
even though such reimbursements may be taxable income under Kowalski
1

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 119.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3401(a).
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3402.
2

'434 U.S. 77 (1977).
5INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 61(a).
4 See United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); Saunders v. Commissioner,
215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
1434 U.S. at 79.
898 S.Ct. 917 (1978).
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unless Congress chooses to expand the definition of wages for withholding,
the judicial branch will refuse to do so.9 Under Section 3402, withholding
is required only from wages which are defined under Section 3401(a) as
"renumeration... for services performed by an employee for his employer."
This decision overrules Revenue Ruling 70-8510 which provides that amounts
paid state policemen for cost of meals (even while on duty) ate taxable
wages subject to withholding tax.
Although of no precedential value, in a recent private letter ruling1'
the internal Revenue Service said that an employee has taxable income of
the cost incurred in furnishing a meal less the amount charged when an
employer operates a cafeteria at a loss for his employees.
The crucial factor in this situation seehis to be that the employees
were not required to eat at the cafeteria, and, therefore, according to the
Service the meals were not furnished for the convenience of the employer. Such
a situation could significantly impact on allocation problems in companies
providing cafeteria services. To the extent that the latter half of the ruling
is inconsistent with Central Illinois Public Service Company, the ruling does
not reflect current law.
i.O2

Net Gift
Is a donor who makes an intervivos transfer of property conditioned
upon the donee's payment of the gift tax subject to income tax on the amount
paid as gift tax? The Tax Court and the various circuits have adopted a
variety of approaches in answering the above question. The answer has
differed depending upon 1 ) whether the gift is made to an irrevocable trust for
the benefit of another and the income from the trust is used to pay the gift
tan; 2) whethet thd gift is coiisideed a "net gift,"' 1k property less the amount of
gift tax pdid, to ah individual who hat previously agreed to pay the tax; or
3) *Mhethdi the tr'ansfet is characterized s involving part sale and part gift.
The Eighth Circuit" and the Fifth Circuit" have held that where the
trustee has discretion to use trust income to pay the donor's gift tax liability,
such income was taxable to the donor under Section 677.11 The Fifth Circuit, however, modified this view in a later decision in which the court held
JId. at 919.
Rev. Rul. 70-85, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 214.
" IRS LErrna RULzNG 7740010 (1977).
1
2See
Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (February 18, 1952); Rev. Rul. 71-232,
1971-1 CuM. BULL. 275.
13 Estate of Sheaffer, 37 T.C. 99 (October 31, 1961), afl'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1963).
14Staley v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1941).
15 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 677.
10
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that the grantor-taxpayer realized no tangible income from payment of gift
tax by the donee when he did not retain an interest in the trust. 6
In Commissioner v. Turner,' the Sixth Circuit adopted the view that
when the donee agreed to pay the gift tax as a condition of the gift, the
transfer resulted in a net gift and no benefit was given to the donor. Section
677 did not apply. Following Turner, the Commissioner argued in the Sixth
Circuit that aside from Section 677, certain amounts paid by the donee
should be taxed as income under Section 6118 and under the facts of Johnson
v. Commissioner," the Sixth Circuit agreed.

The substance of the transaction in Johnson was a gift of $500,000
worth of stock used as security for a $200,000 loan which was transferred
to an irrevocable trust. The trust assumed the obligation for payment of the
loan, and from the proceeds of the loan, $150,000 was used to pay the gift
tax. The donor was left with $50,000.
Section 2502(d) 20 states that payment of the gift tax is the donor's
obligation. By extending the Supreme Court's determination that an employer's payment of an employee's income tax constitutes additional income to
the employee,' the Commissioner contends that payment of the gift tax by
the donee results in taxable income to the donor.12 Although this view had
been rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Turner in favor of the net gift approach,
the Commissioner contends that the Johnson decision overruled Turner."
The Fourth Circuit has issued the most recent decision in the case of
Hirst v. Commissioner." In Hirst, an elderly widowed parent was not held

liable for income taxes when she gave property to her son who agreed to
pay the state and federal gift tax. Although recognizing the earlier Sixth
Circuit decision in Johnson, the Fourth Circuit adopted the view that the
previous Sixth Circuit decision of Turner characterizing the transaction as
a net gift is controlling. Hirst held that since the circumstances of the transaction dispel the notion of gain to Mrs. Hirst, the amount paid as gift tax
cannot be taxable as income to her. 2 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held
that it is not universally true that the discharge of one's obligations is always
16 Estate of Davis, 40 P-H TAx CT.

MEM.

71,318 (Dec. 30, 1971), afj'd, 469 F.2d (5th

Cir. 1972).
17 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
8
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61.
19 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974).
20

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2502(d).
21 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
22

Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).

23

Id.

21

25 Id.

4d.

at 431.
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productive of income." In the Fourth Circuit, the Johnson decision is limited
to its particular facts. The Tax Court has also followed Turner in a later
decision."
1.03

Scholarships

Following a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Ruling 28 that
hospital interns and resident physicians are students rather than employees,
the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 78-5419 stating that the
Service is not bound by the NLRB decision in cases arising under Section
117.30 "The standards used for determining whether individuals are employees
for purposes of labor relations are not the same as those used for federal
taxation."3 " This ruling followed the Tax Court's position as stated in
2
Paseiro v. Commissioner."
In Silk v. United States,3 the Supreme Court answered the question of
whether particular workers were independent contractors or employees within
the meaning of the Social Security Act by stating that the same rules are
applicable as were applied by the Court to questions concerning the status
of workers under the National Labor Relations Act. In light of the Silk
decision, the question of what standards the Supreme Court would apply to
determine whether interns and residents are students or employees for federal
income tax purposes is unanswered.
The Service has consistently taken the position that amounts received
by interns and physicians are not excludable from income as a scholarship
or fellowship where services are performed to benefit the hospital." The Tax
Court has stated that where services are rendered, the amounts received are
taxable as income regardless of whether the intern or resident receives valuable training."5
The Third and Fourth Circuits accept the view that it is not the purpose
of the facility to which the Regulations" refer, but the primary purpose of
at 430.
2 7Victor v. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
2S Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
2, Rev. Rul. 78-54, 1978-1 CuM. BULL. 36.
s0IN-r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 117.
31 Rev. Rul. 78-54, 1978-1 CuM. BuLL. at 36.
3246 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 77,359 (October 6, 1977).
83331 U.S. 704 (1947).
34
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-469, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 79; Rev. Rul. 57-386, 1957-2 CuM. BULL.
107; Rev. Rul. 70-283, 1970-1 CuM. BuLL. 26.
35
See, e.g., Paseiro v. Commissioner, 46 P-H TAx Cr. MEm.
78,359 (October 6, 1977);
74,157 (June 18, 1974); Weisfisch v.
Naman v. Commissioner, 43 P-H TAx CT. MEM.
Commissioner, 43 P-H TAx C. MEM. 74,074 (March 27, 1974).
soTreas. Reg. § 1.117-2.
2eId.
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the payments that is controlling. Even though the facilities' purpose may
be to train doctors, the taxpayers are paid for services rendered.
In Leathers v. United States,"' the Eighth Circuit adopts the view that
it is a question of fact whether the primary purpose is to educate and train
the recipient. Under this view, if the services are found as a matter of fact
to be incidental, the payment may be excluded from gross income as a
scholarship.
1.04

Deferred Compensation
Proposed amendment Section 1.61-1611 to Treasury Regulation Section
1.61" will require that current income be reported when an individual taxpayer has the option of determining if any portion of present compensation
is to be deferred until later years when the taxpayer may be in a more favorable tax position.
Under the Service's present position, deferred compensation is not taxable until a cash basis taxpayer actually receives payment if the parties have
agreed to the deferral in the original contract, " or before the amount is
actually earned. "1 By its acquiescence in Commissionerv. Oates," the Service
may also allow the taxpayer to defer income where the amount is earned, but
payment is not yet due. Additional considerations include whether the taxpayer acquires a present interest either in the amounts credited, or in an
employer's annuity contract used as a funding method, "' or whether the
promise to pay is secured by a note or otherwise."
Rulings where the deferral of payment is at the sole discretion of the
employer "5 will not be affected by this proposed amendment. Current revenue
rulings"' allowing an individual to elect whether or not to defer a portion of
his income to a later date would appear to be no longer applicable. However,
in a letter to Senator Bentsen, Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel Halperin "'
suggests limitations on the extensiveness of the proposed amendment.
Due to the difficulties involved in determining the employer's and em07 471 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1972).
80 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978).

39 Treas. Reg. § 1.61.
40 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174.
41 Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 184.
-207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
43 Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 127.

"4Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20 (1965).
45 Rev. Rul. 69-647, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 106.

" See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 184; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 CuM. BULL.
193; Rev. Rul. 69-650, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 106.
47 11 FED. TAX CooRD. 2d
29,910.
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ployee's reasons for allocating a portion of the payments to a deferred payment plan, in the original negotiations for salary, negotiations for renewal
after the original salary negotiations, or negotiations for renewal after the original contract has expired, the regulations will not be applicable. An exception
exists where there is clear evidence that the employer was "willing to pay
the full deferred amount on a current basis, or that the agreement was solely
for the convenience of the employee." Furthermore, in the above situation,
the regulations will not be applicable even as to a "sole shareholder of a
corporate employer." The effect of the proposed amendment will be limited
to situations where the original contract is renegotiated before expiring, and
where a contract separate from the original contract is negotiated after completion of the original agreement. 8 The Revenue Act of 1978 has frozen
the situation as it relates to deferred compensation as of February 1, 1978,
prior to the issuance of the proposed amendment to the Regulations.
Tuition Fees - Payments by Employer
Tuition fees paid by an employer that do not qualify as scholarships
or fellowship grants, but are compensatory, are included in the employee's
gross income and constitute wages for FICA, FUTA and income tax withholding purposes."9 If the courses taken are job related, however, employer
paid tuition costs are considered to be noncompensatory for the employee
and a deductible business expense for the employer." But if the employer
reimburses the employee for job related tuition fees, the employee must
account to his employer and report the reimbursement (if required) under
the rules in Section 1.162-17(b) of the Regulations. 5
1.05

The situation where withholding is applicable is where there is a
tuition payment plan that pays the fees whether or not the courses taken
will lead to a degree or are job related. If the payment does not meet the
requirements of a scholarship or fellowship grant," or directly meets the educational maintenance and improvement requirements,"3 then the payment
serves as compensation for past or present services, or as an inducement for
future services. " However, the educational expenses may qualify as itemized deductions for the individual employee under Section 1.162-5(c) 55 of
the Regulations as maintaining or improving existing skills."
48ld. at 29,910.
49
Rev. Rul. 78-184, 1978-1 CUM. BULL. 304.
5oRev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1 CuM. BuLL. 308.
51
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b).
52
See 1NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 117.
53See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c).
54
Rev. Rul. 76-352, 1976-2 CUM. BULL. 37.
55
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c).
5eRev. Rul. 76-352, 1976-2 CuM. BULL. 37.
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1.06

Severence Payments
In Arnold Chekow," the taxpayer, an attorney, was employed by a
professional service corporation. The taxpayer owned stock in the corporation,
but was never required to make a capital investment. A severence payment
was made upon taxpayer's departure from the law firm. The firm deducted
$9,000 as additional compensation in the nature of severence pay, while the
taxpayer reported the amount as a long term capital gain from the surrender
of his stock in the firm.
The Commissioner argued that the payments were ordinary income
and not capital gains and that, therefore, the law firm could deduct the payments but that the taxpayer was required to report the payment as ordinary
income. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, maintaining that
since there had been no capital contribution for the stock, there could be
no capital gain for the surrender of the stock. Furthermore, the court noted
that the payment was not in relation to the taxpayer's claimed ownership
in the firm. 8 The court concluded that the taxpayer was never a real shareholder for tax purposes."
1.0'7

Deferral of Farm Income

The Tax Court in Schniers v. Commissioner60 held that a taxpayer did
not constructively receive income from the sale of cotton in the year the
cotton was grown but realized income in the year when actually paid. On
March 13, 1973, the taxpayer entered into two contracts to sell all of the
cotton harvested from two specific plots of land to a cotton company at a
price keyed to government loan values. 61 Pursuant to the contracts, the taxpayer planted, harvested and ginned the cotton during the months of November and December in 1973.62
On or about December 4, 1973, the taxpayer entered into five deferred
payment contracts which provided that no advance or payment of any kind
would be made by the cotton company prior to January 2, 1974, regardless
of the delivery date. The taxpayer was paid pursuant to the terms of the
contract."3
The taxpayer desired to spread his income over a two-year period. This
57 1978 P-H TAX CT. MM.
78,330 (August 21, 1978).
581d. at 78-355. The taxpayer claimed ownership of 25% in the firm for a net worth of

approximately $73,000, yet his payment for the redemption of his stock was only $9,000.
59 id.
069 T.C. 511 (1977).
e1 Id. at 512.

id.
e3 Id. at 513.
02

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 1
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:2

was necessary because a cotton crop planted during 1972 was harvested and
sold in early 1973.6'
The IRS maintained that under Section 1.451-(2) (a) 6 5 of the Regulations the taxpayer had constructively received the proceeds from the deferred payment contracts upon the signing of the contract on December 4,
1973.6 The Tax Court noted that the contract of March 13, 1973, provided
no specific date for payment."" However, the deferred payment contracts expressly provided for payments on or after January 2, 1974.8 The court concluded that a valid binding contract with the objective to conduct business
transactions so as to reduce the incidence of federal taxation does not make
it any less a bona fide contract. 9 The court held that the transaction was not
a sham because the evidence showed that the parties looked upon the contract as an instrument defining their legal rights.7"
An alternative argument advanced by the IRS in the Tax Court was
that the taxpayer had changed his accounting method without prior approval of the Secretary as mandated under Section 446(e) " of the Code and
Section 1.446-1 (e) (2)2 of the Regulations.7 3 The court ruled that the execution of these contracts was not a change in the taxpayer's method of accounting, noting that farmers have great flexibility in timing the receipt of taxable
income. "
Another cotton farmer did not fare so well in the Tax Court. In H. N.
Watson, Jr. v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayer entered into a deferred payment
agreement on November 29, 1973, for the sale of cotton. The taxpayer was
to receive as consideration for the sale an irrevocable banker's letter of credit
which the bank guaranteed it would accept and honor on January 10, 1974.'
The Tax Court held that the letter of credit received by the taxpayer was
property within the meaning of Section 1001(b)." Under Texas statute,"8
64 Id.
65

Treas. Reg. § 1.451-(2)(a).
66 69 T.C. at 515.

6?Id.
68 Id.

soId. at 516.
7O Id.
71

INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(e).
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2).
7. 69 T.C. at 519-20.
74
ld. at 520.
76 69 T.C. 544 (1978).
7?ld. at 547-48.
77Id. at 549.
72

71TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.106(a) (2) (Vernon 1968).
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the taxpayer, as the beneficiary of the letter of credit, is the only party allowed
to modify or revoke the credit. Thus, the Tax Court accepted the Service's
argument that an irrevocable banker's letter of credit is equivalent to cash."'
In conclusion, farmers attempting to defer income must carefully construct the transaction so as to avoid the lumping of income into one calender
year. In addition, the effects of state law must be considered to avoid transforming a deferred payment into the equivalent of cash.
2.00

Exclusions From Income

3.00
3.01

Exemptions
Dependency Exemption - Children of Divorced Parents
In Revenue Ruling 78-9180 the IRS sought to clarify Revenue Ruling
73-17581 and Section 152(e) (2)82 concerning the dependency exemption
for children of divorced parents. The situation covered by Revenue Ruling
78-91 is where "A and B are divorced parents of three children.... The
decree of divorce provided that A would be allowed to claim exemptions
of the three children as long as A made support payments of $100 a month
for each child. During 1977 A made 12 payments of $300 each."' B married C during 1977. B had no income, but contributed to the care of the
three children from C's income. The problem lies in the fact that B and C
together contributed more than A and B for the support of the children.
Revenue Ruling 78-91 makes it clear that C's contributions for support
may be attributed to B, so that A and B together with contributed payments
from C will meet the one-half support requirement of Section 152(e) (1).,
After the divorced parents meet the combined support rule, the parents may
then proceed to the special rule of Section 152(e) (2). Since A and B had
a dependency allowance clause in their divorce decree, and A met the $600
support requirement,8" then A is entitled to the dependency exemptions for
the three children.
The reasoning behind Revenue Rulings 78-91 and 73-175 was first
announced in Colton v. Commissioner,8" which held that it was immaterial
79 69 T.C. at 552.
so Rev. Rul. 78-91, 1978-1 CuM. BuLL. 36.
81 Rev. Rul. 73-175, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 58.
82
1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 152(e)(2).
83 Rev. Rul. 78-91, 1978-1 CuM. BuLL. at 36-37.
4INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 152(e)(1).
8

5INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 152(e)(2)(A)(ii).

8656 T.C. 471 (1971).
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whether the support payments were from the former husband's funds alone,
from jointly owned funds, or from his new wife's funds."
"The objective of the Section 152 (e) exceptions was to allow the
divorced parents to agree between themselves that the noncustodial parent
would have the dependency deductions .... Congress did not intend this
objective to be defeated by remarriage of divorced parents." 88 Otherwise,
as under the previous rule, 89 the payments of the custodial parent and new
spouse would have to be traced, and the problems of community and noncommunity property rules, which Colton sought to avoid, would arise.
4.00

Deductions

4.01

Medical Expense - Capital Improvements
In Ferris v. Commissioner,9" the Seventh Circuit recently held that the
allowable medical deduction for a swimming pool addition to the taxpayer's
home is "[t]he minimum reasonable cost of a functionally adequate pool and
housing structure... "' reduced by the increase in property value due to
the building structure. This decision reversed the Tax Court 2 and the case
was remanded for a factual determination of the minimum reasonable cost
and the increase in the value of the property.
The swimming pool was constructed after a physician advised the
taxpayer, who suffered from a spinal injury, to swim twice daily to prevent
paralysis. The swimming pool was constructed at a cost of $194,660. The
materials and workmanship of the structure were comparable to the taxpayer's residence which was valued at $275,000 before the addition. An
appraisal indicated that the swimming pool addition increased the value of
the taxpayer's residence by $86,160. Subtracting this amount and the costs
of non-essential items amounting to $22,500, from the total costs of the
pool addition resulted in an $86,000 medical expense deduction according
to the taxpayer. Despite the Service's contention that a large part of the cost
additions was due to the personal taste of the taxpayer, the Tax Court
allowed the deductions maintaining that taxpayers are not limited to the
cheapest form of medical treatment available. 3
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that even though individuals may choose
87 Id. at 474-75.
88 Rev. Rul. 78-91, 1975-1 CuM. BULL. at 37.
89
Rev. Rut. 71-19, 1971-1 Cu . BULL. 43.
90 42 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 78-5674 (7th Cir. August 15, 1978).
91 Id. at 5677.
02 345 P-H TAx Cr. MEM.
77,186 (June 14, 1977). See also Briner, Federal Income Tax
Developments: 1977, 11 AKRON L. REv. 227, 235 (1977).
9345 P-H TAX Cr. MEM.
77,186 at 766 (June 14, 1977).
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an expensive physician or select a private room over a cheaper form of treatment, such care is direct and distinguishable from the present situation which
is indirect. Any costs above those necessary to produce a functionally adequate facility are not incurred for medical care. "
Although the Service had offered some evidence that an enclosed pool
satisfying the taxpayer's medical needs could have been built for $70,000
and that such a structure would increase the property's value by $31,000,
the Seventh Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient to make a decision
as to how much medical deduction to allow. Furthermore, there was some
evidence presented that the addition of a $70,000 structure would actually
reduce the value of the taxpayer's residence, in which case, the entire $70,000
would be allowed as a deduction.
Medical Expense - Disability Insurance Premiums
In Curtis A. Weber," the Tax Court upheld a determination by the
Commissioner that the premiums paid for an insurance policy that only provided for indemnity in the case of total disability were not deductible as
medical expenses under Section 213."
4.02

The petitioner had an insurance contract with the Allstate Insurance
Company whereby Allstate agreed to pay a monthly benefit of $500 for each
month of the insured's total disability resulting from sickness, subject to
certain limitations. The policy defined total disability as disability that continuously prevents the insured from performing the duties of his occupation.
The petitioner contended that the premiums paid for this coverage were
deductible under Section 213.
Section 213 (a)1 7 allows a taxpayer to deduct amounts paid for the
medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse and dependents. Medical care is
defined in the Code as including amounts paid for insurance covering the
cost of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, or for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. 8.
The Tax Court noted that "[t]he report of the Committee on Ways and
Means explaining the statutory language [of Section 213] stated that insurance
contracts providing indemnity for loss of income, or for loss of life, limb
or sight, are insurance for other than medical care."9 The court concluded,
therefore, that:
94 42 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 5677.

78,110 (February 21, 1978).
95 1978 P-H TAx CT. MEM.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 213.

96

7

Id. at § 213(a).
1d. at §§ 213(e)(1)(A), (C).
991978 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 78,110 at 492.

98
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Based on a review of the provisions of the policy, it is clear that no
part of the $229.00 premium is deductible by the petitioner under the
provisions of section 213. The policy provided for indemnity for loss
of income or loss of life, limb and sight, not for the cost of services
described in section 213. The triggering event of [the coverage] was
disability. Petitioner could have collected from Allstate without incurring
any cost of medical care. Furthermore, the fact that the policy had a
provision relating the benefits to the insured's earnings further evidences
the fact that [the coverage] indemnified petitioner for loss of earnings
rather than the cost of medical care."'
Medical Expense - Laetrile
Section 213101 permits a deduction of payments for certain medical
expenses, including expenses for medicine and drugs, actually paid by the
taxpayer during the taxable year. The term medicine and drugs includes
"only items which are legally procured and which are generally accepted as
falling within the category of medicine and drugs."1 2

4.03

Revenue Ruling 78-32513 established that amounts paid by a taxpayer
for laetrile are amounts paid for medicine and drugs and are deductible as
medical expenses under Section 213 where the use of laetrile was prescribed
by the taxpayer's physician and the drug was used in a locality where the
sale and use of laetrile is legal.
Research and Development Expenses
In Carl R. Johnson,'" the taxpayer was in the business of selling tax
shelter annuities. In addition he claimed to have been engaged in the study
of economics, with particular relation to the gross national product. The
taxpayer deducted, pursuant to Section 174,15 all of his normal living expenses such as food, shelter and transportation. The IRS maintained that the
taxpayer's normal living expenses could not be deducted as research and
development expenses. The taxpayer argued that his research related to
money, so that everything he spent was part of his research.'
4.04

The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's contentions and held that there
were no deductible research development expenses."' The court noted that
research and development expenses are deductible only if they are made
1o Id.
10 1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 213.
102 26 C.F.R. § 213-1(e)(2).
'a3Rev. Rul. 78-325, 1978-36 INT. REv. BULL. 24.
35,307 (1978).
104 37 CCH TAx Cr. MEM.
0
1 5INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 174.
35,307 at 1232.
106 37 CCH TAx Cr. MEm.

207 Id.
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by the taxpayer "in connection with his trade or business.""'° The expenses
deducted by the taxpayer were "not for the purpose of research and development, but to meet the personal needs of the taxpayer."' "
Medical and Charitable Deductions - Credit Cards
Revenue Rulings 78-3811 ° and 78-39" 1 dealing with charitable and
medical deductions were in response to the Tax Court's decision in Grannan
v. Commissioner."' In Grannan, the taxpayer executed a note to a hospital
for his dependent sister's medical costs. The hospital transferred the note
to a bank for the full amount and later the taxpayer borrowed money to
pay off the note. The taxpayer then took medical deductions as he made
payments on the loan, most of the payments being made the following year.
The court held that the medical costs were deductible in the year the note
was executed and that the deduction was not postponed to the years the
loan is repaid. 1 ' Under these revenue rulings, credit card charges for medical
expenses and charitable contributions are deductible in the year the charge
is made regardless of when the bank is repaid. Since the card holder cannot
prevent receipt of his contribution or payment, the transaction is deemed the
equivalent of borrowing funds to make the deductible payment or contribution.
4.05

4.06

Illegal Rebates and Discounts
The Tax Court has arrived at a compromise between an earlier line
of cases and Section 162 (c)"' on illegal payments. In James Alex,"' the
taxpayer, a life insurance salesman, made rebates and discounts to new
purchasers contrary to state law. Under his contract with the insurance company the taxpayer could receive commissions greater than the policies' first
year premiums. A discount and rebate scheme was devised whereby purchasers would pay little or nothing of the first year premiums. From the
amount received for commissions, the taxpayer would deduct "discounted
premiums."
The issue was whether the "discounted premiums" were an adjustment
to gross income or a business expense deduction. The Tax Court placed great
emphasis on the word deduction in Section 162 (c) (2),1 holding that
1954, § 174(a) (1). See Briner, supra note 92, at 243.
37 CCH TAx CT. MEM. t 35,307 at 1232.
110 Rev. Rul. 78-38, 1978-1 CUM. BULL. 67.
M11
Rev. Rul. 78-39, 1978-1 CUM. BULL. 73.
112 55 T.C. 753 (1971).
118 ld. at 755.
114 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(c).
115 70 P-H T.C. T 70.29 (May 24, 1978).
116 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(c)(2).
108

INT. REV. CODE of

109
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illegal discount and rebate deductions would be disallowed.1 17 However, the
illegal rebates and discounts would be allowed as adjustments to gross income for actual purchase prices as in Pittsburgh Milk v. Commissioner."'
The court noted, however, in James Alex, that only the buyer or seller
may adjust gross income in this manner." 9 In this case the insurance company was the seller and not the taxpayer. The premiums were established
by the insurance company, the contracts were actually sold by the company,
the company assumed all contract liability, and the company was entitled to
the premiums. Thus, as far as the taxpayer was concerned, the illegal discounts and rebates were deductions and not allowable under Section 162(c).
Hedge Agreements - Unreasonable Salary
The hedge agreement requires that an officer-shareholder repay to the
corporation those amounts which are later disallowed as unreasonable compensation. Such an agreement avoids the problems of double taxation that
result when the payments are treated as dividends to the shareholder in
addition to being nondeductible to the corporation.
4.07

The hedge agreement, however, may be becoming a two-edge sword.
In Castle Ford, Inc.,120 the Tax Court stated that the hedge agreement between the sole shareholder-president and Castle Ford, "contemplated the
possibility that a portion of the salary might be disallowed as unreasonable
an element which is entitled to some consideration.' 21
The Tax Court's reasoning was first adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Charles Schneider & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,'22 where the
court found that the hedge agreement, "may reflect a pre-existing knowledge
on the part of the taxpayers that the payments would not be reasonable for
tax purposes, and could lead to an inference as to their intent."' 23 This same
analysis has also been applied in the Fifth Circuit to infer pre-existing knowledge of the salary's unreasonableness.12 '
Despite these decisions the hedge agreement remains a viable tax planning device since it is only one of the elements that will be considered in
determining the resonableness of the compensation. In all of these cases the
record of low dividends, sudden jumps in salary, and the sole authority of the
117 70 P-H T.C. at 180.
118 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
'19 70 P-H T.C. at 180.
78,157 (April 28, 1978).
120 1978 P-H TAx Cr. ME .
2
1ld. at 688.
22 500 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1974).
at 155.
'1d.
12,Saia Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1976).
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shareholder-officer to set his salary remained the most important elements
considered by the courts.
4.08

Deduction for Estate Taxes - I.R.D.
"Income in respect of a decedent" is defined as "those amounts to
which a decedent was entitled as gross income but which were not properly
included in computing his taxable income for the taxable year ending with
the date of his death or for a previous taxable year under the method of
accounting employed by the decedent."' 2 5 Under Section 691 (a) 26 the
amount of all items of gross income in respect of a decedent that are not
included in computing the decedent's taxable income shall be included in the
gross income for the taxable year received, of the person, who by reason
of the death of the decedent, acquires the right to receive the amount. Section
691 (c)"I provides that a taxpayer who is required to include in gross income
an amount in respect of a decedent may deduct that portion of the estate
tax imposed upon the decedent's estate which is attributable to the inclusion
in the decedent's estate of the right to receive such amount.
Revenue Ruling 78-20312s addressed the issue of whether the amount
deductible under Section 691 (c) was to be claimed as an itemized deduction
or as a deduction from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income.
The Service concluded that "for purposes of computing the regular income
tax under part I of Subchapter A of the Code, [the taxpayer] must take the
deduction allowed by section 691 (c) of the Code as an itemized deduction
subject to any limitations and restrictions on deductions generally and not
as a deduction from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income."1 9'
4.09

Interest -

Loans on Insurance Policy

The Court of Claims held in Lee v. United State?3" that the interest
paid to a life insurance company in connection with a loan transaction that
required prepayment of premiums and the subsequent borrowing of the same
amount from the life insurer at interest is not deductible."i The disallowed
transaction consisted of the taxpayer paying the annual premium, the present
value of the next four years' premiums discounted at three percent, and the
interest on the amount borrowed contemporaneously at four percent. When
the prepaid premium fund was supplemented by the three percent interest
earned on the amount, it was sufficient to pay the next four years' premiums.
12326 C.F.R. § 691(a)-l(b).
U26 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 691(a).
a2TINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 691(c).
126 Rev. Rul. 78-203, 1978-1 CuM. BULL. 199.
299 Id.
at 199.
1$0571 F.2d 1180 (Ct. C1. 1978).
181Id. at 1184.
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The loans and interest equaled the cash surrender value of the policies, and
the cash surrender value was always greater than the amounts added to
replenish the prepaid fund. The taxpayer borrowed against the increased
cash surrender value to its full amount. These transactions were found by
the court to be like those in Ballagh v. United States13 where the prepayment
of premiums and the borrowing back of the same amount at interest was
held to be a sham transaction. 33
The interest deductions were allowed, however, when the taxpayer did
not use a prepaid fund. In that situation the taxpayer still borrowed against
the full cash surrender value to pay mainly the subsequent years' premiums.
The court based its reasoning on the illiquidity of the taxpayer and found
the latter transactions to be equivalent to borrowing from a bank to pay
annual premiums."'
4.10

Education Expense
The IRS has tried unsuccessfully to deny deductions of educational
expenses to those who have left their jobs with no specific intent to return
or to those who are unemployed after furthering their education. In Robert
1. Picknally, 5 the taxpayer had resigned from his job as a school principal
to obtain a Ph.D. in educational administration. After obtaining the degree
the taxpayer was unemployed, but he had held part-time jobs relating to
his trade or business. The IRS disallowed his educational expense deductions
on the grounds that the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business
within the meaning of Section 1.162-5 (a) (1) of the Regulations."' The
Tax Court, citing prior cases,""7 stated that a taxpayer can still be engaged
in a trade or business, although currently unemployed, if he was previously
involved in and intends to return to that trade or business. However, amounts
expended in preparation for the resumption of a business or trade at some
indefinite time are not deductible." 8 Since the taxpayer was actively seeking
a job in the same trade or business and had not been employed in another
profession during this time, the deduction was allowed. The court rejected
the argument of indefiniteness based solely upon the fact that the taxpayer
had been unemployed for a period of more than one year.
In a later case, Donald C. Hitt,3 the taxpayer's spouse left her em132 331 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
133

Id. at 878.

184571 F.2d at 1185.

135 46 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 77,321 (September 20, 1977).
' 36Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1).
137 See, e.g., Haft v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 2 (April 3, 1963).
138 See, e.g., Owen v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 377 (November 30, 1954).
139 1978 P-H TAX Cr. MEM, 78,066 (March 3, 1978).
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ployment for a doctoral program with no specific intention to return to her
former job. However, after she had completed the education she returned
to the same job. The deductions were disallowed by the IRS on the premise
that she was not carrying on a trade or business while obtaining her degree.
The Tax Court reversed, holding that she had only temporarily removed
herself to sharpen the skills required for her same trade or business. The
three years taken were appropriate for this objective and the doctorate would
not equip her for a different career. The deduction was allowed, but the
court added the caveat that the longer one is away from his former job, the
greater the weight of evidence that the taxpayer is no longer carrying on a
trade or business while attending school." ' The taxpayer was also permitted
to deduct the costs of meals and lodging incurred by his spouse while away
from home and attending college since she was only temporarily away from
home and still in her trade or business.'
4.11

Business Expense -

Rental Expense

Under the provisions of Section 16212 a business may deduct the ordinary and necessary expenses of conducting its business. " ' However, rental
expenses are allowed as a deduction under Section 162 only if they are
reasonable.'
In O.T.M. Corp.,' two businesses were controlled by common ownership. During the audit of one of the businesses, O.T.M. Corp., the IRS determined that the other business had been charging O.T.M. Corp. unreasonable
rental costs for equipment. As a result, the Service denied as a deduction the
amounts deemed unreasonable. However, the Service also denied the other
business' claim that its income should have been reduced by the amount
deemed excessive. This determination resulted in an additional $17,474 of
income tax liability.'
The taxpayer brought suit claiming that the IRS must allocate income
and deductions among controlled corporations pursuant to Section 482."'
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district's court
rejection of this argument.'" The court agreed that if the IRS had relied
on Section 482, then the income of the other corporation would have been
140

See, e.g., Canter v. United States, 354 F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
1 78,066 at 335.

141 1978 P-H TAx CT. MEM.
142 INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§ 162.

I" See Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 513 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1975).
144See Brown Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1958).
145
77-2 U.S.T.C. T 9693 (1977), afl'd, 78-2 U.S.T.C. 9430 (5th Cir. 1978).
24 6 Id. at 88,338.
14T INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 482.
148 78-2 U.S.T.C.
9430 at 9431.
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proportionally reduced. But the court concluded that since the IRS denied
the deduction as unreasonable under Section 162, the provisions of Section
482 are inapplicable.
Sale and Leaseback Arrangement
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,1"9 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals" 0 and upheld a sale and leaseback arrangement thereby permitting the taxpayer to deduct depreciation
on the building and other expenses relating to the transaction."' Justice
Blackmun, writing for a seven to two majority, noted that "so long as the
lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status,
the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax purposes. '
4.12

In Lyon, the Worthen Bank & Trust Company desired to construct a
multistory bank and office building. However, due to banking regulations,
Worthen was unable to finance the construction with its own funds.' In
order to effectuate construction of the building, Worthen proposed a sale
and leaseback arrangement. 5" The plan was approved subject to certain
conditions"' by both the Arkansas State Bank Department and the Federal
Reserve Board.' 56
Following negotiations, the terms of the sale and leaseback arrangement
were set forth in four documents executed in May, 1968. The first document
was a ground lease from Worthen to Lyon of the land upon which the building
was to be constructed. The lease term was seventy-six years and seven months
(May 1, 1968 through November 30, 2044). The ground rent was $50 for
the first twenty-six years and seven months; $100,000 a year for the next
five years; $150,000 a year for the next five years; $200,000 a year for the
next five years; $250,000 a year for the next twenty-five years; and $10,000
a year for the final ten years.
The second document was a sales agreement dated May 19, 1968,
between Worthen and Lyon. Under the terms of this agreement Worthen,
which was actually constructing the building, agreed to sell it to Lyon, piece
by piece, as constructed, for a total price not to exceed $7,640,000.
149435 U.S. 561 (1978).
150 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
151 435 U.S. at 584.

152

Id.

155 Id. at 563-64.
154 1d. at 564.
155 The Arkansas State Bank Department required that Worthen possess an option to purchase
the leased property at the end of the fifteenth year of the lease at a set price. The Federal
Reserve Board required that the building be owned by an independent third party.
1'5 435 U.S. at 564.
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Under the terms of the third document, Lyon was to lease the building
back to Worthen for a primary term of twenty-five years beginning on December 1, 1969, with options to extend the lease for eight additional fiveyear periods. The building lease was a net lease, making Worthen responsible
for all repairs, insurance, taxes and utility charges. For the first eleven years
of the lease, the rent was $582,324 a year. For the next fourteen years the
rent was $613,157 per year. Under the renewal options the rent was $300,000
a year. Worthen was given an option to repurchase the building and leasehold on November 30, 1980, at a price of $6,325,170; on November 30,
1984, at a price of $5,432,607; on November 30, 1989, at a price of
$4,187,328 and on November 30, 1994, at a price of $2,145,935.
The fourth document was a permanent financing agreement between the
New York Life Insurance Company and Lyon for $7,140,000 in the form
of a 6 % twenty-five year self amortizing loan, with full recourse against
Lyon's net worth.""
The Internal Revenue Service determined that Lyon was not the owner
of the building for tax purposes and therefore, could not deduct interest on
the debt or depreciation on the building. The Service assessed a deficiency
in Lyon's federal income tax for 1969 in the amount of $280,387.20 including interest."' Lyon paid the assessment and filed a timely claim for its refund. 9 The district court ruled in Lyon's favor and held that the claimed
deductions were allowable."' 0 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.""' The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case because of a
conflict with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in American
Realty Trust Co. v. United States.""2
The Court rejected the government's contention that the decision in
Helvering v. Lazarus & Co.' was controlling. The Court noted that the
present case involved three parties, Worthen, Lyon and New York Life1 "
and "[t]hus, the presence of the third party... significantly distinguishes
this
16
case from Lazarus and removed the latter as controlling authority.
The factor that was deemed the most significant by the Court was the
fact that Lyon alone, and not Worthen, was primarily liable on the notes to
157
158

Id. at 565-68.
Id. at 569.

259 Id.
160
161

36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-5059 (1975).
536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).

12498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).

'"308 U.S. 252 (1939).
164 435 U.S. at 575.
165 Id.at 576.
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New York Life. "No matter how the transaction could have been devised
otherwise, it remains a fact that as the agreements were placed in final form,
the obligation on the notes fell squarely on Lyon. Lyon, an ongoing enterprise, exposed its very business well-being to this real and substantial risk."""
The Court concluded,
that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple party transaction with
economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or
regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and
is not shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have meaningless
labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights
and duties effectuated by the parties. " '
5.00

Tax Credits

6.00

Depreciation

7.00
7.01

Gains and Losses
Capital Gains - Installment Sales
1 0 the taxpayer acquired 20% control of Arvin
In William D. Pityo,
Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Arvin) in 1967 through the purchase of a block
of Arvin's common stock. After the taxpayer had terminated his employment
as vice president of the company in 1971, he began investing in oil wells.
The taxpayer incurred a $175,000 loss from the oil business in 1971 and
1972. In addition, the taxpayer incurred liability for a $200,000 loan procured for the business." 9
Because of the taxpayer's financial plight and the fact that the block
of Arvin stock made up 90% of the taxpayer's assets, the taxpayer began
investigating other possible investments. He agreed with his financial adviser
and private attorney to sell his appreciated property (securities) to three
separate trusts set up for the benefit of his wife and two minor children in
return for receiving long term installment notes as consideration for the selling
price " ° Within a short period of time, the trustee, a local bank, sold 21,500
shares of Arvin and invested the cash proceeds in a mutual funds periodic
withdrawal program. 7 ' From the regular withdrawals from the mutual funds,
the trustee made the required payments under the installment notes of $4,300
per month for 240 months to the taxpayer."7 Under the installment contract,
20

Id. at 577.

167 Id.

2- 70 P-H T.C.
269 Id. at 126.

70.21 (May 15, 1978).

270 Id.
271 Id. at
172Id.

127.
at 128.
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the payments for the first year were less than thirty percent of the selling

price.
In this particular fact pattern, the taxpayer had attempted to convert
his assets into ready cash and defer the gain over a period of time by the
installment method. Section 4531" provides that the Secretary shall prescribe
regulations allowing a taxpayer to dispose of personal property on an install-

ment plan to consider as income that proportion of the installment actually
received in the tax year to which the gross profit is realized or to be realized

as it relates to the contract price. Simply put, the taxpayer must report each
year only the profit generated by the installment payments. A sale or other

disposition under Section 453 has been construed by Revenue Ruling 65155"' to also mean an exchange hereby allowing the taxable gain to be
proportioned over the installment period. Selling price is defined as the
total consideration received by the vendor including liabilities assumed by
the purchaser which in turn include the amount of any mortgage on the
property sold." " The selling price is determined only by the face amount
of the installment contract; it is never determined by the use of market valuation techniques. " '
The individual taxpayer, in order to meet the prerequisites of Section
453, must insure that the payments in the year of the sale, disregarding
evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser and liabilities assumed by the
purchaser, do not exceed 30% of the selling price."" The vendor need not
receive any payment inthe year of the sale.1"8
An element essential to the transaction is economic substance. In Revenue Ruling 74-157,11" the Internal Revenue Service denied Section 453 tax
treatment to the taxpayer upon the sale of stock at fair market value by a
father to his son who later resold to an unrelated party. The main reason
for the unfavorable treatment was that the first sale under the preconceived
negotiated. plan lacked economic substance.180 Economic substance is lacking
when there is no legitimate purpose for the transaction as when the transaction serves only as an artful and crafty design to cheat the government out
of revenues. Revenue Ruling 73-536181 held that a purported installment
sale between family members followed shortly thereafter by a resale to an

I's

Tr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(a).
7
14
Rev. RuL 65-155, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 326.
IsTreas. Reg. § 1.453-4(e).
17eTreas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b)(1); Rev. Rul. 74-384, 1974-2 Cum. BuLL. 152.
lTIlNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(2)(ii).

at § 453(b)(2)(a)(ii); Treas. Reg. H9 1.453-1(c)(1)-4(b)(1).
219 Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 Cum. BULL.313.
178ld.

1so Id.

181 Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-2 Cum. BULL. 158.
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unrelated third party lacked substance where it was the intention of the
family members to resell the property and receive full payment upon such
resale.
In the present case, the court recognized that the installment sale to
the trusts was a key device in obtaining financial security for the taxpayer's
family.' 82 Both parties had stipulated that the gain from the sale of the Arvin
stock should be accorded capital gain treatment. 8 ' The essential issue was
whether the capital gain should be reported in the year the stock was sold
by the trustee or as the taxpayer received the installment payments.'" The
Service's position was that the trustee was a mere conduit of title for the
taxpayer's sale of the stock on the open market. 85 The Tax Court announced
that it would follow the principle espoused in Griffiths v. Commissionera8 6
and examine the actual command over the property and not the form of the
transaction.
The test applied by the court was enunciated by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Commissioner v. Rushing.' In order for the taxpayer to qualify
the transaction under the installment sale provisions, the taxpayer "may not
directly or indirectly have control over the proceeds or possess the economic
benefit therefrom." 88
The Tax Court believed that the taxpayer had fulfilled the requirements set forth in Rushing. The Court noted that the taxpayer had been
advised by his private counsel of the consequences of his action in establishing
the irrevocable trusts. '" The provisions of the trust expressly empowered the
trustee to utilize his own sound judgment in investing the corpus of the
trust.'-9 In addition, the express provisions in the trust allowing the trustee
to invest in mutual funds were included to comply with the Federal Reserve
Bank policy.' 9
An important element in the court's determination that the taxpayer
never had direct or indirect control over the proceeds from the sale of stock
was the fact that the taxpayer had no contact with the trustee after the
182

70 P-H T.C. at 130.

Id.
Id. at 129.
185 Id.
'- 308 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1939).
287 52 T.C. 885 (1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
188 70 T.C. at 129 quoting Rush v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1971).
189 Id.at 130.
190 Id.at 127.
292 Id. at 130.
188
184
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completion of the sale. 2 To rebut the Service's position that the petitioner had
control over the proceeds from the sale of the stock, the court turned to
the relevant Florida law.' 93 In the court's opinion, it was quite clear under
Florida law that the trustee was under a duty to manage the corpus of the
trust only in a manner to serve most efficiently the interests of the trust's
beneficiaries." ' Thus, the decision to sell the stock was made by the trustee
in accordance with his fiduciary duty owed to the trust's beneficiaries.' The
present facts showing an informal understanding between the trustee and the
individual taxpayer is not controlling. When the original seller has prearranged with a third party for the ultimate resale or transfer of the proceeds
back to the original seller, only then will the court deny the taxpayer the
right to reap the tax advantages under the installment sales method.""
Several other cases relied on by the Service were distinguished by the
court. In Griffiths v. Commissioner,'" ' the United States Supreme Court
denied installment sales treatment because the intermediator was a corporation wholly controlled by the seller thereby allowing the seller to retain
direct control of the proceeds. In contrast, the trusts in the present case were
controlled by the trustee, not the taxpayer. Wrenn v. Commissioner' also
involved a transaction involving family members dealing with mutual funds.
A husband and wife entered into a sale of securities in which all securities
were transferred to the wife at the date of the sale but the payments were
to be made in monthly installments over a fifteen-year period. 99 In order
for the wife to meet the payments under the installment obligation, the wife
invested the proceeds in mutual funds.'"° Because interspousal sales are
subject to close judicial scrutiny, the court in Wrenn found that there was
no independent purpose for entering into the transaction."' Pityo was distinguished because of the existence of financial presence of economic benefits. 2 ' Another case distinguished by the court was Williams v. United
States."3 The taxpayers had sold standing timber to a purchaser who was

193

Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.

294

ld.

292

'95 Id. at 132, citing Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 814 (1950); Oakes v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 524, 529 (1965); Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 794, 804 (1954).
196 Id. at 132.
197308 U.S. 355 (1939).
19867 T.C. 576 (1976).
"19Id. at 577-78.
-Old. at 578.
201 Id. at 583.
202 70 P-H T.C. at 133.
203 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
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willing to pay the full purchase price. " But at the urging of the seller, the
purchaser placed four-fifths of the price in escrow with the escrow agreement
providing for installments over a four-year period.0 Due to the fact that the
proceeds were constructively received by the taxpayers, the taxpayers in this
particular situation were not entitled to installment sales treatment.0
8.00

Procedure

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,207 special tax provisions
were codified to deal with the interrelationships between federal, state, and
local income taxes and bankruptcy. However, the Act provides that if there is
a conflict between the Reform Act and the Internal Revenue Code, the
Internal Revenue Code is controlling.0 8
8.01

Under Section 346 (b) (1)2"9 a new tax entity known as the "estate"
is created in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases and is taxed similar
to a decedent's estate under Section 641210 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Under these provisions the individual cannot be taxed himself but only
through the estate. These provisions do not apply in a Chapter 13 proceedis required to give the Internal Reveing."' A trustee for a decedent's estate
nue Service notice of his appointment. 2
Though the income is to be determined in the same manner as the tax
of the estate, there are some noticeable changes. A partner is accountable to
the estate for income tax purposes for any gain or loss from property distributed from a partnership after the commencement of the case. 1 ' Present
law is not clear as to whether the individual partner or the partnership must
report the gain or loss from a distribution of property from a partnership
after the commencement of the case.2" Secondly, the accounting method of
the debtor shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of
the case. 5 Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the trustee could
20

16d. at 524 n.2.

205
2

Id.

209

1d. at § 346(b)(1).

21 0

INT. REv. CODE

0 Id. at 527.
207 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
208 11 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1978).

211
212

of 1954, § 641.

11 U.S.C. § 346(d).
JINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6036.

213 11

U.S.C. § 346(b)(1).

2 4

2 PRCTicG LAw INSTITUTE, BANKRUPTCY

215

11 U.S.C.

REFORM ACT OF

1978

at 271

(1978).

§ 346(b)(3).
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elect the method of accounting."' The trustee can choose to report on a
calendar or fiscal year." '
A significant change is found in Section 346 (c) (1) stating that a corporation and partnership continue in existence after the commencement of a
bankruptcy case. Regarding a partnership, this is a drastic change from the
current position in which the trustee files a form 1041 on behalf of the partnership and bankrupt partners."' The Reform Act would require the trustee to
complete and file form 1065.219 More importantly, under Sections 728 (c)
and 728 (d), respectively, the Service cannot use exempt property of partners
to satisfy claims against the partnership nor could the partner accept a refund
on behalf of the partnership. The refund becomes an asset of the estate under
codified procedural requirements and the trustee for a corporation or a partnership in a bankruptcy proceeding is required under Section 364 (c) (2)
to file a tax return thereon. However, the Internal Revenue Code is more
specific in requiring the trustee to pay any legally owing taxes."' In contrast,
an individual debtor 2 ' is no longer required to complete his own return for
the whole calendar year 2 but in Chapter 723 and Chapter 11,I2' only at the
date of the order of relief preceding the tax. The tax year for a corporation or
a partnership ends at the commencement of the case in Chapter 7225 and Chapter 1122 proceedings.
The last major attempt by Congress to codify bankruptcy procedure
is Section 1146 (d). The statute permits any proponent of a reorganization plan in a Chapter 11 proceeding to request a government finding concerning the tax consequences of the reorganization. The bankruptcy
court may, in the case of an actual controversy, issue a declaratory judgment
on the tax effects. The declaratory judgment is to be issued on the earlier of
the date of the government response to the proponent's request on the tax
effects of the plan2 2 ' or 270 days after the proponent has issued the written
request. 28 However, the right of the bankruptcy court to issue a declaratory
judgment conflicts with Internal Revenue Code Section 7421. Under paraRev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 632.
PluCTIc O LAW INSTrrUE, supra note 214, at 274.
218 Id.
218

217

219

d.

22 0

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6151(a).

221

11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

222 Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 632.
22 11 U.S.C. § 728(a).

Id. at
Id. at
226ld. at
22
71d. at
2281d. at
224

25
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§
§
§
§

1146(a).
728(b).
1146(b).
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graph one of subsection (b) of Section 7421, the bankruptcy court is clearly
prohibited from assessing or collecting any amount of federal tax liability.
Since Section 1146 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act does not specifically defer
to the Internal Revenue Code as Section 346 does, court cases determining
the applicability of 1146 (d) will likely occur.
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, secured debts are to be first satisfied out of the bankrupt's estate. The unsecured debts are to be satisfied next
out of the estate. Among unsecured creditors, the present Bankruptcy Act
provides that certain unsecured creditors are to be paid in full from the dividends of the estate before any other unsecured creditors are to receive dividends.2 '
Within the class of debts having priority over those of the general creditors, there is a priority of claims regardless of any priority imposed
by state law. Costs and expenses of administration rank first in priority,
which include principally all actual and necessary costs of preserving the
estate after the filing of the petition, filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases or by persons other than the bankrupt in involuntary cases, and
reasonable costs and expenses for property transferred by the bankrupt for
the benefit of the estate. 3 Second in priority among these claims are claims
up to $600 of income by a wage earner within a period of three months prior
to the commencement of the proceedings. 3 ' Under Section 64 (a) (3) of
the Bankruptcy Act, the third priority involves the costs and expenses incurred by creditors opposing a discharge, a Chapter 13 plan, or arrangement
and expenses for obtaining evidence to be used by the government in convictions under Chapter 9 of Title 18 of the United States Code.' The fourth
priority involves taxes legally owing and due to the United States government, state government, or any municipal subdivision 3' within three years
preceding bankruptcy or where one of the exceptions dealing with taxes under
Section 17 (a) (1) applies." ' The last priority includes debts other than
taxes owed to the United States and landlords' liens specifically provided
for by state law.2" 5
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, effective generally October 1,
1979, with the new bankruptcy system taking effect in April 1, 1984,36
229

id. at § 104.

28 0 Id. at
1
23 Id. at
2
23 1d, at
3
2 8 Id. at
234 Id. at
235 Id. at
236 Id. at

§
§
§
§

104(a)(1).
104(a)(2).
104(a)(3).
104(a)(4).

§ 35(a)(1).
§ 104(a)(5).
§ 402.
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changed the law as to priorities among certain unsecured creditors. The first
priority under the new law is given to administration expenses."3 7 The second
among the priorities is a creditor's claim which arises in an involuntary case
during the ordinary course of the debtor's business after the filing of the
petition.
Wage claims including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay
with a new upper limit of $2000 are the third priority.23 The fourth priority
includes employee fringe benefits such as claims for contributions to employee
benefit plans including pension, health, or life insurance plans arising 180
days before the filing of the petition." ' The maximum amount under the claim
is $2000 times the number of employees under the plan.2 ' The Reform Act
created a fifth priority for consumer creditors which is limited to $900 for
the purchase of personal services, the purchase of property or rental of
2 42

property

The last of the priorities include state and federal taxes.24 2 The priority
for income taxes is limited to taxes due within three years of the filing of
the petition.4 4 Other taxes granted priority among unsecured creditors include
property taxes, employment and withholding taxes, excise taxes, customs
duties, and tax penalties which represent a pecuniary loss. ' Taxes other
than income taxes are not granted the priority for three years after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.
Priority claims are paid first in a liquidation case 2 6 and under a case
in Chapter 11247 or Chapter 1328 proceedings. Therefore, the Bankruptcy

Reform Act has changed the Service's favorable position among the priorities
in collection of claims from the debtor's estate into a position not as strong
as under present law.
The present law provides that taxes, i.e., federal, state or local, legally owing and due for less than three years are nondischargeable.2 9 The determination
of the tax liability of the debtor is made by the bankruptcy court, provided
that the tax issue has not been contested before or adjudicated by a court
2

S7Id. at § 507(a)(1).
23s ld. at § 507(a) (2).
239

2 0

4

2

Id. at § 507(a) (3).
Id. at § 507(a) (4).

41ld. at § 507(a) (H) (A).

2 42
243

Id. at § 507(a) (5).

Id. at § 507(a) (6).

4

Id. at § 507(a) (6) (H) (i).
245Id. at § 507(a)(b)(B)-(G).
46
2 1d. at § 726(a)(1).
2 4

Id. at § 1129(a)(9).
Id. at § 1322(a)(2).
249 Id. at § 35(a)(1).
247

2

48
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of competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, both
under present law 5 ' and the Bankruptcy Reform Act.251
Despite the recommendations that all taxes legally owing and due for
more than a year are to be discharged, Congress adopted a varied approach
as to the time periods for dischargeability of taxes. Federal and state income
taxes, employment taxes and excise tax become dischargeable three years
after becoming legally owing and due.252 Property taxes and customs duties
become dischargeable one year after becoming legally owing and due.25 It
is not necessary for the government under Section 523 (a) (1) (A), regarding taxes receiving priority under Section 597 (a) (6), to file a claim to prevent the debt from becoming dischargeable.
Further, the Bankruptcy Reform Act incorporates the present law by
retaining the exceptions to discharge without regard to a time limit under the
conditions of fraud, late filing, or failure to file a tax return.25 ' The Bankruptcy Reform Act specifically did not remove the unlimited dischargeability
of debts for failure of an officer to withhold various taxes as found in the
present law.255 However, the new Act has appeared to remove the government's privilege to proceed against the exempt property on discharged tax
debts for nondischargeable tax debts. 56
Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197857 allows the taxable
entity,2 the debtor,5 9 or the trustee 6 ' to file a claim on behalf of any creditor. It is possible to construe Rule 303 of the Bankruptcy Rules to allow the
the debtor-bankrupt to file a claim on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service.
As to the question of the determination of fied tax claims, Section 505
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 allows the bankruptcy court to
rule on the tax liability of the responsible party except for any tax, penalty,
or addition that was adjudicated before the commencement of the case. 62 A
second exception applies to the bankruptcy court making a determination of
2 50

ld. at § 11 (a) (2) (A).

251

Id. at § 505.
at § 523(a)(1)(A).

25

21d.

25

3
2 54

I.
1d. at § 253(a)(B)

255

Id. at § 523(a)(1)(A).

2 56

d.
Id.
2 58
Id.
2 59
Id.
257

at
at
at
at

§
§
§
§

& (C).

35(a)(1)(e).
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501(G).
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any refund to a debtor or estate. 6 The court cannot make a finding regaiding
a refund until the earlier of 120 days after the trustee requests such refund
from the government or a determination by the government of such a request.
The trustee may always request a determination of any unpaid tax liability during the administration of the case by submitting a tax return to the
proper governmental unit. 211 If the return is not fraudulent or does not contain
a material misrepresentation, then the debtor or any successor to the debtor
is not liable after the payment of the taxes upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions. 6 One of the following conditions will suffice: the failure of the
government to notify the trustee within sixty days after such request that
examination will be done, 67 the governmental unit does not complete the
examination within 180 days of such request," 8 the payment of the tax after
hearing and notice by the court and governmental unit examination is completed, 2 ' or upon the payment of the tax as determined by the governmental
270
unit.
Suits Against the IRS
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision," held
that Sections 2680 (a) and (h)' 7 of the Federal Tort Claims Act barred an
accountant's claim against IRS agents for malicious prosecution, abuse of
process and libel and slander. An accountant, Fay Anderson, had an office
in LeMars, Iowa. In accordance with the IRS's Tax Preparer's Program, a
program implemented to locate dishonest tax preparers, two IRS agents came
to Anderson's office in February, 1973, and supplied him with manufactured
income and expense statements.2 7 Anderson prepared their returns. A short
time later, IRS agents revisited Anderson's offices. Anderson, after being advised of his rights, relinquished to the IRS agents 132 files.'" After carefully
investigating the files, the IRS arrested Anderson for allegedly violating
Section 7206(2) "'- which prohibits willful aiding, assisting, procuring,
8.02

2631d. at § 505(2)(B).
26
4ld.

at § 505(2)(B)(i).

2651d.

at § 505(b).
at § 505(b)(1).
at § 505(b)(1)(A).

2661d.
267ld.

at § 505(b)(1)(B).
at § 505(2).
2
10ld. at § 505(3).
271 Anderson v. United States, 548 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819
(1977).
27228 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (h) (1970).
2681d.
269

d.

273 548 F.2d at 251.
27

'4 d.

276 Id.
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counseling or advising the preparation of a false or fraudulent tax return.
Upon hearing of Anderson's arrest, the local news media reported the event.
At the preliminary hearing, however, the magistrate dismissed the criminal
charges against Anderson." '
Anderson brought an action for invasion of privacy, wiretapping, and
damage to business and reputation allegedly resulting from the negligent
design and implementation of the Tax Preparer's Program.
Anderson contended that the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
barring any claim for an act or omission performed as a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency, even if discretion was abused, did
not apply in this particular case.2" ' The court found sufficient statutory support for the Tax Preparer's Program in Section 7206 (2) to dispel Anderson's assertion that the entire Tax Preparer's Program was unauthorized by
statute and thus not within the purview of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 7 8
Anderson argued alternatively that the IRS agents acted outside the regulations promulgated by the Service regarding the investigation of tax preparers
for violations under Section 7206 (2). The court found that argument to be
lacking for two reasons: 1) the complaint never contained the allegation and
2) the court would not allow relitigation of the district court's finding that
the IRS agents were acting within their scope of authority. 79
The third argument raised by Anderson was that the negligence complained of took place at the operational stage of the Tax Preparer's Program
and not at the planning stage. The court entirely agreed with the district
court's determination that the actions by IRS officials fell within the planning
stage of the program and were classic examples of the type of decisions
wherein policy factors are considered. As such, the court concluded that
Anderson's claims were barred by the discretionary acts exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act." °
In conclusion, the court found no basis for Anderson's claim for recovery. In addition, the court ruled that Section 2680 (h) 2 11 of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, barring claims against investigating agencies for assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution would also prevent recovery for damages. 82
The question now raised is whether a taxpayer has any recourse against
276 Id.
277

278
2T

Id.
Id. at 252.
Id.

280 Id.

28128 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
282

(1970).

548 F.2d at 252.
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the IRS for damages caused by publicity for wrongful arrests or action. The
United States Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,"s removed the absolute
immunity from liability granted government officials for damages resulting
from actions with improper notices or with malice. The absolute immunity
doctrine was replaced by the Court with a qualified immunity. A government
official is protected under the qualified immunity doctrine upon a finding that
at the time of the act or ommission there existed reasonable grounds for the
official to believe that his action was appropriate. " ' In addition, the official
must have acted in good faith." 5
In Mark v. Groff, 8 8 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower
court's finding granting absolute immunity to IRS agents. The court remanded
the proceedings to the district court to determine the scope of the agents'
authority and whether the agents had acted in good faith. In Mark, the
appellant claimed that the IRS agents maliciously, intentionally, and wantonly
took certain actions to disrupt his tax preparation business and to cause him
extreme emotional distress.
Recent cases have attempted to define more precisely the bounds of
the qualified immunity accorded government officials. In Brobeck v. Plasko 8" '
the taxpayer, the president of a car dealership, had signs posted on the
premises warning that all officers of the law would be treated as trespassers.
Two IRS agents, after investigating the 1970 and 1971 returns of the taxpayer, issued a summons pursuant to Section 760311 to search the corporation's books and records. The taxpayer refused to cooperate and was incarcerated for failure to obey the summons. The taxpayer was ultimately released despite his rather doubtful explanation that he did not have custody
of the summoned records. Thereupon, the taxpayer brought an action for
trespass. The district court dismissed the suit holding that the agents acted
in good faith and within the scope of their duties."'
The United States Supreme Court, in General Motors Leasing Corp. v.
United States,"' held that the warrantless entry by Internal Revenue Service

officers into the petitioner's corporate office violated the corporation's fourth
amendment rights against invasion of privacy and unreasonable searches and
seizures. The determination of whether the agents' actions fell within the
288416 U.S. 232 (1973).
284 Id. at 247.
293 ld. at 248.
286521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975).

34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-6010 (D.C.Pa. 1974).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7603.
29 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-6011.
287

28 8

290429 U.S. 338 (1977).
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qualified immunity standards set forth in Scheuer was not addressed by the
Court, as the case was remanded for the determination of damages.
As a result of these decisions, a taxpayer can recover damages from IRS
agents only when, considering all the relevant circumstances, the agents
acted in bad faith and outside the scope of their duties.
8.03

Jury Awards
In Rediker v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.,2 ' an
employee recovered $450,000 from the railroad company under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act" for the loss of a leg and other injuries sustained
when he fell beneath the wheels of a railroad car on which he was coupling
air hoses. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment
on all issues including the trial court's prohibiting evidence of the impact of
federal tax law upon the damages to be awarded."
The court relied upon the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Spencer
v. Eby Construction Co. 9 ' in excluding all evidence concerning the fact
that the damage award would not be taxable to the plaintiff under the provisions of Section 104 (a) (2).95 The factors listed by the court in refusing
such evidence included the complexity in the computation of the tax benefit,
the fact that any mitigation of damages by the jury would nullify the legislative intent of giving an injured party a tax benefit, that income tax liability
or savings is only a matter of concern between the injured plaintiff and the
IRS, and that the amount of income tax on one's future earnings is too speculative to be utilized in determining damages."
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.9 . in the case on
constitutional grounds, in effect refusing to consider the railroad's argument
that the failure to allow the employer under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act to establish the impact of federal income tax on a jury award, while the
employee was permitted to introduce speculative evidence as to damages,
deprived the railroad of its property rights under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. As a result of the Supreme Court's position of refusing to find a constitutional question, it would
appear that the federal and individual state jurisdictions are left free to determine the correctness of charging or not charging the jury regarding the
1 Kan. App. 2d 581, 571 P.2d 70 (1977).
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
293 1 Kan. App. 2d at 581, 571 P.2d at 70.
294 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 19 (1960).
2 95
INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 104(a) (2).
290 1 Kan. App. 2d at 588, 571 P.2d at 76.
291

29245

297 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
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exclusion of certain elements of a jury award from gross income under
Section 104 (a) (2).
&04

Duties of Tax Return Preparers
Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, Congress set minimal levels of competence for income tax return preparers in order to protect the taxpayer from
unqualified individuals. An income tax preparer is defined under Section
7701 (a) (36) (A) 2 as a person who prepares a substantial part of a tax
return or claim of refund for compensation, or one who employs one or more
persons to prepare tax returns or claims for refunds. One is not considered
an income tax return preparer merely by: 1) typing or reproducing the return;2 9 9 2) preparing a return or refund for the employer by whom the person
is regularly and continuously employed;"'0 3) being a fiduciary preparing a return or claim for a refund for any trust or estate;"0 ' 4) preparing a claim for
refund for a taxpayer in response to a notice of deficiency or in response to a
waiver of restriction after the commencement of audit of a taxpayer or another
taxpayer if the determination of the audit of the other taxpayer affects the tax
liability of such taxpayer."°
Section 6109 (a) 311requires that the income tax preparer sign his name
to the tax return and place his identifying number (social security number)
and address on the tax return. A penalty of $25 is assessed against the income tax preparer for failure to sign a return' " or furnish the identifying
number."' The income tax preparer's only defense to such assessment is to
show that the failure to comply is due to reasonable cause and not because of
willful neglect.
To insure the competence of the income tax return preparer, a preparer
will be assessed a $100 penalty for understating the taxpayer's liability
through intentional, negligent,3 01 or willful disregard' of the Code. The taxpayer's liability for the understatement of tax liability still remains in full
effect.
After a tax return is completed, the income tax return preparer, under
Section 6107,1" must give a copy of the return to the taxpayer and must keep
298

2 99

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a) (36) (A).

1d. at
8O01d. at
80 Id. at
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2d. at
$03 Id. at
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a record of the name and taxpayer identification number of the taxpayer or
a copy of his return. Failure to furnish the taxpayer with a copy of the tax
return will result in a penalty of $25 unless the preparer shows that the failure
is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. 09 The failure of
the preparer to retain a copy of the return or a list of the names and taxpayer identification numbers of the taxpayers will result in a penalty of $50
for each failure, up to a maximum penalty of $25,000, unless the preparer
can show that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. 10
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 also placed a legal duty on the employer
of income tax return preparers to file an information return. Section
6060 (a)... requires that the information return contain the name of each
preparer employed, the taxpayer identifying number of each preparer, and
the place of work of each employed preparer. The IRS, pursuant to Sections
6695 (e) (1)112 and 6695 (e) (2)11 respectively, will assess a penalty of
$100 for failure to file an information return and a $5 penalty for failure to
set forth a required item on the information return. As in all penalties assessed
for failure of the income tax preparer to follow statutory commands, the
preparer must pay the penalty unless it is shown that the failure is due to
reasonable cause and not willful neglect.
Two other significant statutory duties are imposed on income tax preparers. The tax preparer is not allowed to endorse or negotiate a taxpayer's
refund check and any violations will result in a $500 penalty being assessed
against the preparer. 11 The last significant duty imposed on the income tax
preparer is to not disclose any information furnished to him or for him in
connection with preparation of return or declaration. 1 The unauthorized
disclosure or use of information by preparers could result in a criminal penalty up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to one year or both, together with
the costs of prosecution. 6
Though the Code prescribes a specified conduct for income tax preparers, the IRS has implemented modifications on the duties of tax preparers.
Revenue Announcement 78-91"'1 forbids employers of income tax return
preparers to be assessed penalties for failure to provide their employees'
309 Id. at § 6695(a).
o10
Id. at § 6695(d).
3

2 Id.
2 Id.
13
S id.
S14 Id
81

at § 6060(a).
at § 6695(e)(1).
at § 6695(e)(2).

at § 6695(f).

Id. at § 7216.
311 Id. at § 7216(a).
815

31" Rev. Announcement 78-91, 1978-23 INT. REv. BULL. 40.
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social security numbers on federal income tax returns and on claims for refunds filed before June 30, 1978.
Another recent release 1s of the IRS states that for returns filed prior
to January 1, 1979, no penalties will be assessed against income tax preparers
for failure to compute and report the additions to the tax imposed under
Sections 6654319 and 6655320 for failure to pay estimated tax. Section 1.66941 (d) 21 of the Regulations clearly states that the failure of the preparer to
compute and report additions under the estimated tax sections of the Code
will result in an understatement of tax liability in violation of Section
6694(e)322 for intentional or negligent disregard of the rules and regulations.
However, due to the confusion in the practioner community, the IRS will
allow the aforementioned grace period.
Revenue Ruling 77-18431" states that an income tax preparer who also
operates a check cashing agency at the same address will not be in violation
of Section 6695 (f) 2 , when cashing income tax refund checks that are
properly endorsed by the payee even though the checks are cashed for individuals for whom the preparer had prepared returns. Without this ruling,
the income tax preparer, despite the most innocent intentions, would have
been assessed a penalty under Section 6695 (f) of $500 for each check
cashed.
The latest clarification by the IRS as to the Code sections governing the
income tax return preparer is Revenue Ruling 78-245."', Under Revenue
Ruling 78-245, the period of limitations on assessments of income tax return
preparer penalties may be extended under Section 6501 (c) (4).S11 Though
Section 6501 (c) (4) specifically refers to taxes, Section 6659 (a) (2)82 '
provides that any reference to tax in the Code shall be deemed to include
penalties in Chapter 68 of the Code. All of the penalties that are assessable
against income tax return preparers are found in Chapter 68.
8.05

Elimination of District Conference

In Revenue Proclamation 7809,-

the IRS announced that the District

828 Rev. Release 1980 (April 3, 1978).
29 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6654.
$20 Id. at § 6655.
321 Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(d).
322 NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6694(e).
322 Rev. Rul. 77-184, 1977-1 CuM. BULL. 407.
32, INT. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 6695(f).
25 Rev. Rul. 78-245, 1978-1 CuM. BuLL. 436.
326INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6501(c) (4).
52T Id. at § 6659(a)(2).
828 Rev. Proc. 78-9, 1978-1 CuM. BULL. 563.
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Conference would be eliminated in order to make administrative appeals
procedures more effective. Another underlying purpose for modifying the
procedure was to achieve an earlier development and disposition of docketed
cases.
Regional counsel now has exclusive jurisdiction over any case docketed
in the Tax Court upon the fulfillment of one of the following conditions:
1) if the notice of deficiency, liability or other determination was issued by
the Appellate Division; 9 2) if the notice of deficiency, liability or other
determination was issued after an appellate consideration by Employee Plans
Exempt Organizations function; 8 ' or 3) if the case was docketed under Code
Sections 6110 (public inspection of written determinations) or 7477 (declaratory judgments relating to transfers of property from the United States)."'
The Appellate Division will have exclusive settlement jurisdiction over any
case docketed in the Tax Court for a period of four months commencing
at the time the Appellate Division receives the case from the chief counsel."'
The Appellate Division's exclusive settlement jurisdiction will exist on the
condition that the statutory notice of deficiency or liability was issued by any
District Director of the IRS or by the Director of International Operations. 3 '
Within forty-five days of the receipt of the case, the Appellate Division
will arrange a settlement conference. 3 The Appellate Division has the authority to settle less than all issues in the case and to refer the unsettled issues
to the regional counsel for disposition. 3 ' After the four month period of
settlement jurisdiction by the Appellate Division, the regional counsel will
have exclusive authority to dispose of the case."'
However, regional counsel may extend the Appellate Division's settlement jurisdiction for a period not to exceed sixty days, but in no event beyond
the date of the receipt of a trial calendar or trial status order upon which the
case appears." ' Any further extensions require the personal approval of the
regional counsel and it must be established that the probability of settlement
of the case in its entirety by the Appellate Division clearly outweighs the
need to commence trial preparation."3
When regional counsel obtains sole jurisdiction over the case, it will
829Id. at
830 Id. at
331 Id.at
832 Id. at

563, § 1.
563, § 1.
563, § 2.01.
563, § 2.02.

ass id.

a"Id.
833 Id.
38e Id.at 563, § 2.03.
837 Id.
ass ld. at 563, § 2.04.
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acquire the facts necessary for the development of the case through informal
conferences and discovery proceedings."'9 The Appellate Division will make
available files and information for the regional counsel to reply to any request
made by the court or take any action "in the best interests of the Government."3 1,0
Before counsel may consider settlement negotiations, the case must be
fully developed and the regional counsel must have evaluated the position of
the IRS as to litigation.3 ' Counsel is also required to solicit the views of the
Appellate Division in cases designated by the Appellate Division before
making an offer of settlement. 2 Any objection by the Appellate Division to
an offer for settlement made by counsel must be expressed with fifteen days.8"3
The chief counsel may, by appropriate order, require review by the regional
counsel or the chief counsel, of counsel settlements of certain cases. " '
If the Appellate Division disagrees with a proposed settlement it may
protest the settlement and require the settlement to be reviewed by the regional
counsel. ' In this instance, the Appellate Division must support its position
and its view of an acceptable settlement by a memorandum. ' " The regional
counsel's decisions in these protest cases are final.""7
When issues in docketed and nondocketed cases are pending before the
Appellate Division and such issues are related to issues in cases in which
counsel has sole jurisdiction, the settlement offer must be accepted by both
counsel and the Appellate Division.3" Where a case is docketed in the Tax
Court under Code Sections 6110 or 7477, the assistant commissioner and the
deputy chief counsel will have joint settlement jurisdiction until brief due
dates are set or until the first day the case appears on the trial calendar,
whichever is earlier. Past this point, regional counsel has sole settlement
jurisdiction." '
These new rules concerning appellate and settlement procedures will
be applicable to all cases docketed with the Tax Court after June 30, 1978.80
The new procedure will also be applicable to cases pending in the Tax Court
38

9ld. at 563-64, § 2.05.
Id. at 564, § 2.06.

"I Id.
842 Id.
"s Id.
a" Id.
348 Id.
8a4 Id.
"I Id.
a- Id.
"0Id.
850Id.

at
at
at
at
at

564,
564,
564,
564,
564,

§
§
§
S
§

2.07.
2.08.
2.09.
2.08.
2.09.

at 564, § 2.12.
at 564, § 2.13.
at 564, § 3(A).
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on June 30, 1978, if the following circumstances exist: 1) the notice of deficiency was issued by either the District Director, or the Director of International Operations, or the Director of a Service Center or 2) a settlement conference has not been held by the Appellate Division prior to July 1, 1978." 5'
For any cases pending in Tax Court on June 30, 1978, that do not fall in
the above categories, the procedures specified in Revenue Proclamation
60-78111 will continue to be applied,"3' except that the sole authority to dispose
of cases will rest in counsel at the earlier of either the date of receipt of the
trial calender on which the case is posted, "' or the date on which appellant
and counsel conclude settlement negotiations without final disposition of the
case."5 These new rules are to be followed in all cases by July 1, 1979.5
Effective July 2, 1978, regional counsel has been assigned responsibility
for all refund litigation, in addition to the Tax Court litigation.

8.06

Summons Authority - Third Party Records
The United States Supreme Court gave a split but affirmative answer
to the question "[wihether an internal revenue summons may properly be
issued to obtain third-party records in aid of an administrative investigation
conducted by the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether it should
recommend to the Department of Justice that a taxpayer be prosecuted for
criminal tax violations." ' In United States v. LaSalle National Bank,"'6 the
Court lessened the likelihood of intervention concerning administrative summonses "issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal
prosecution" 3 9 and gave the Service increased latitude in the issuance and
defense of summonses under Code Section 7602.360
The terms "good faith" and "recommendation for criminal prosecution"
have been a source of controversy since their inclusion in the holding of
Donaldson v. United States."' In its opinion in LaSalle, the Seventh Circuit
35, Id. at 564, § 3(B).
52 Rev. Proc. 60-78, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 988.
353 Rev. Proc. 78-9, 1978-1 CuM. BULL. at 564, § 3(c).
354 1d. at 564, § 3(c)(.01).
355 Id. at 564, § 3(c)(.02).
356
1d. at 564, § 3(c)(.03).
857 Petitioner's Brief for certiorari at 2, United States v. LaSalle Nat' Bank, 98 S. CL 2357
(1978).
315898 S. Ct. 2357 (1978).
859 Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971).
86
0 NIT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 7602.

861 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971).
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found the Third,"' Sixth, 6 " Ninth,"' and District of Columbia365 Circuits
generally in support of permitting a "criminal purpose" defense to succeed
when challenging a summons under Section 7602.6 The "good faith" requirement of Donaldson was found lacking when a summons was issued by the
Service solely in aid of anticipated, but not yet "recommended," criminal
prosecution." '
The Supreme Court relied on its prior decision of United States v.
Powell" ' to define the elements of good faith necessary for IRS summons
authority. "[The Service] must show that the investigation will be conducted
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the
purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have
been followed ... . "369 Although alleged to have been issued solely for criminal discovery purposes, 70 the summons was ruled as having been issued in
good faith under Powell."'
The Court noted that the Service cannot try its own prosecutions, but
depends upon the Department of Justice to perform criminal litigation." '
Since no recommendation other than one to the Justice Department could
result in criminal prosecution, and since one had not been made, the Donaldson "recommendation" defense was ruled nonapplicable. 1 5
The "criminal purpose" shield of Donaldson has been effectively stripped
from the taxpayer by LaSalle. Strict interpretation by a bare majority has
made a successful challenge of an administrative summons nearly unattainable.
8.07

Summons -

Attorney-Client Privilege

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Joseph," enforced the Internal Revenue Service's right to require an attorney to produce,
pursuant to the summons power of Section 7602,111 corporate records en362 United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975).

863 United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
364 United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975).
65
United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
360 554 F.2d 302, 306-08 (7th Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court noted the importance of
settling the differences of opinions among the courts of appeal concerning the scope of
summons authority. 98 S. Ct. at 2362 n.6.
367 554 F.2d at 308-09.
368

379 U.S. 48 (1964).

98 S. Ct. at 2366, citing 379 U.S. at 57-58.
370 98 S. Ct. at 2360.
37' Id. at 2368.
369

3 72

1d. at 2365.

73

3 /d. at 2368.
37 560 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1977).
3
75INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7602.
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trusted to the attorney by his client. A special agent had requested the corporate records from the attorney's client in connection with a tax investigation of
a third party who had allegedly violated the federal gambling statutes. The
attorney contended that the refusal of the IRS to give any guarantee that
the information would not be used in a criminal tax prosecution and the
attorney-client privilege prevented the court from enforcing the summons. 3
The court found on the critical issue of good faith that the summons
was issued in good faith based on the statements of state law enforcement
officials and confidential informants.'" In determining that the summons was
utilized only to gain relevant data on the tax liability of a third party, the
court concluded that the test of issuing a summons only in good faith and prior
to recommendation for criminal prosecution, as announced in Donaldson v.
United States,378 had been met.
The attorney relied heavily on the Sixth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Henry"9 where the court found that the IRS acted in bad faith in
issuing a summons to an attorney. The court, besides distinguishing Henry
from the present case on the issue of good faith, based its determination in
part on the fact that corporate records were involved.8 The court noted
that it is well established that a corporation may not claim a privilege against
self-incrimination, nor may a corporate officer refuse to produce records of
the corporation on fifth amendment grounds.38 1
The attorney's contention that the summons violated the attorney-client
privilege was dispelled on the strength of Fisher v. United States. 8' The court
noted that the nature of the materials summoned, corporate records, rebutted
the argument." 3 The court emphasized that even though the attorney was an
agent of the taxpayer, the taxpayer was not compelled to do anything and,
therefore, the taxpayer's fifth amendment privileges were not violated by the
enforcement of the summons directed toward the attorney. 3"
9.00

Inventory

10.00 Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Ownership Plans
560 F.2d at 743-44.
377 Id. at 744.
370

378400 U.S. 534 (1971).

a79 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974).
380 560 F.2d at 746.

Id. at 746, citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-85 (1911); United States v.
Peter, 479 F.2d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1973).
3s,

382425 U.S. 391 (1976).

383 560 F.2d at 747.
384 Id. at 746-47, citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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11:00 Corporations
11.01
Brother-Sister Corporations
Circuit by circuit, the Tax Court's definition of brother-sister controlled
corporation groups is being reviewed and reversed. Nevertheless, the latest
ruling, Delta Metalforming Co., Inc., 85 holds with its since reversed predecessors and favors the taxpayer by permitting an exemption to Code Section
1563 (a) (2),3"6 thus allowing him the corporation's multiple tax benefits
rather than restrictions under Section 1561 (a)."87 However, if the Fifth Circuit follows the lead of the Fourth and Eighth, this taxpayer victory will be
short lived on appeal.
The sole example of brother-sister corporations found in the Treasury
Regulations is as follows:
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q, R, S,
and T, which have only one class of stock outstanding, is owned by the
following unrelated individuals:
Individuals

Q

P

Corporations
R

S

60%

60%

-

-

-

C --------

40%

--

D ........

-

40%

--

E ---------

-

-

40%

60%
A ........
B

......

Total

60%

40%

100%

100%

100%

100%

T

Identical
Ownership

100%

60%

-

-

-

-

100%

60%

Corporations P, Q, R, S, and T are members of a brother-sister controlled group."'
In this example, four of the individuals have no voting power in four corporations each.
In Delta, only one individual lacked voting power, and this was true
for only one corporation." 9 Inclusion of that person's interests was necessary
to satisfy the brother-sister requirement that "at least 80 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80
percent of the total value of shares of all classes of the stock of each corpos86 1978 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 78,354 (September 7, 1978).
88
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1563(a)(2).
8
7 Id. at § 1561(a).
388
Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), ex. 1.
389 1978 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. at 1474.
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ration" had to be possessed by five or fewer persons." 0 The Service contended that this person's interests should be included, with Delta losing surtax
exemption benefits."' 1 Delta countered that the brother-sister relationship required that each stockholder be considered as owning shares in all companies
concerned.""
By holding for the taxpayer, the court has repeated its statement that
the Treasury Regulation example of a brother-sister corporation is incorrect."' The Tax Court requires more than the mechanics of Section 1563
(a) (2); it requires some interest to be held by all parties in all parts of a
controlled group. This requirement exists for the taxpayer who can take advantage of it, at least until all the circuits or the Supreme Court states otherwise.
Unreasonable Accumulation of Earnings Bardahl Formula Questions
Under the 1965 "Bardah 9" formula," the Internal Revenue Service
established guidelines to determine the sufficiency of liquid assets to meet
corporate operating costs. 9 Assets over and above the calculated amount
are assessed for additional taxation under Code Section 531 as unreasonable
accumulations of earnings." 6 As predicted by John Chommie, Bardahl was
merely an incipient stage of development in this field."'1 The Tenth Circuit
has recently elaborated on the formula in Central Motor Co. v. United
States,"" holding that a finance company's credit cycle may be considered
in reducing its operating cycle, thus reducing the amount of working capital
required to meet the costs of operation."'
11.02

Section 531 imposes a tax of 27 % on accumulated taxable income
not exceeding $100,000 and 38 % on that in excess of $100,000.410
Its purpose is to prevent avoidance of income tax by prompting the distribution to shareholders rather than retention by corporations of earnings and
3 90

3
392

NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1551(b).
1978 P-H TAx CT. MEM. at 1474.
Id. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1561 (a) (2) states to "[take] into account the stock owner-

ship of each such person.. ." but the meaning is disputable.
393

See also Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976),

rev'd, 548

F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977); T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977),
reversing a Memorandum Opinion of the Tax Court.
894 Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 1 65,200 (July 23, 1965).
395 Id. at 1140-43.
39 6
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 531.
39 J3. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 619 (2d ed. 1973).

sgs 583 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1978).
39ld. at 481-83.
00
4
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 531.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss2/1

44

et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1978
Fall, 1978]

FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1978

profits.4 0' The Bardahl decision found that an operating cycle "[consisted] of
the period of time required to convert cash into raw materials, raw materials
into an inventory of marketable... products, the inventory into sales and
accounts receivable, and the period of time required to collect ...outstanding
accounts.. ,"02 By dividing the year by the operating cycle and multiplying
that number times the operating costs per cycle, one may calculate the total
amount of liquid assets annually necessary for all operations.
The refinement in Central Motors is an application of the above, with
consideration being given to words contained in the later case of Bardahl
InternationalCorp."°3 This case called for:
consideration [to] be given ... to the length of time ...accounts payable for the purchase of inventory remained unpaid; in other words, the
average period of credit extended [by one's supplies] ... . [T]he length
of the cycle is reduced by the lag between the time [one] receives the inventory and has to pay for it.'0 '
The Tenth Circuit has laid the way for reduction of the cycle contingent
on submission of sufficient evidence to support the contention that the corporation was permitted to defer payments.' 5 However, a proposed reduction
of the operating cycle was found unacceptable due to the general nature of the
government's contention that thirty days was Central Motors' average credit
period.' 6 Specific evidence of the actual period for which credit payments
were deferred is required. On remand, the operating cycle of the company
will be determined through use of the Bardahl formula to include credit
considerations.
It is interesting to note that, though the court could find no case which
had previously applied the Bardahl formula to finance companies, such an
application was held permissible.0 7 While admitting that the formula had
been found inapplicable to "service" companies' and title and trust companies, 09 its previous application to sales companies, "10 leasing companies," 1
401 Id. at § 532; 34 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. at 1140.
402 34 P-H TAX CT.MEM. at 1141; 583 F.2d at 478.
403 Bardahl Int'l Corp., 35 P-H TAx CT. MEM.
66,182 (August 5, 1966).
404 Id.
at 1063.
405 583 F.2d at

480.

406 Id.
40 7 1 d. at 483.
408 See, e.g., Myron's Ballroom v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 502, 588 (C.D. Cal. 1974),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 548 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1977).
409 See, e.g., Inter-County Title Co. v. United States, 75-2 U.S.T.C. t 9845 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
410 See, e.g., 35 P-H TAX CT. MEM. at 1051; Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1972).
411 See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. of Miss. v. United States, 535 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (Ct. C1.

1976).
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and others swayed the court into concluding that finance companies sbould
not be excluded, at least not as a matter of law."1 2
Gift of Corporate Stock Followed by a Redemption
In Revenue Ruling 78-197,"' the IRS ruled that a taxpayer with voting
control of both a corporation and an exempt private foundation who donates
shares of the corporation's stock to the foundation and through a prearranged
plan causes the corporation to redeem the shares, does not realize income
from the redemption. However, the Service ruled that the taxpayer-donor's
proceeds from the redemption will be treated as income if the tax-exempt
foundation is legally bound or can be compelled by the corporation to surrender the shares for redemption.414
11.03

The facts presented in the ruling are similar to those in Palmer v. Commissioner.415 In Palmer, the Palmer College of Chiropractic was a profit
making Iowa corporation with 72% of the stock owned by a trust administered by the taxpayer. 1 ' The taxpayer owned the remaining shares in his
417

own name.

The taxpayer decided that the college should be turned into a nonprofit institution. 4" It was the taxpayer's belief that the alumni would support
the school if it were evident that the taxpayer's family would not be enriched
by any contributions." 9 In addition, any contributions would be deductible
for federal income and estate tax purposes. 20
To fulfill his goal, the taxpayer organized the Palmer College Foundation. The IRS in a private letter ruling qualified the Foundation as a taxexempt organization under Section 501 (c) (3). '21 According to a carefully
prearranged plan, the Foundation acquired all of the corporation's stock that
was held in trust in exchange for a note payable in annual installments over
a thirty-five year period." The taxpayer then made a contribution to the
Foundation of corporate stock sufficient so that the Foundation owned 80%
of the stock of the corporation. On the next day, the board of directors of
412 583 F.2d at 483.
413

Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 CuM. BULL. 83.

41Id.

62 T.C. 684 (1974), affd, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975). See Briner, Federal Income
Tax Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REv. 206, 203 (1975).

415

416 Id.

417ld.

at 686.

428id.
419 ld.
420
421

ld. at 687.
d. at 689.

422 Id.
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the corporation voted to redeem the shares of stock by transferring all of the
assets of the college to the Foundation. 23'
The Commissioner argued that the transaction constituted a redemption
under Section 301 ' " taxable to the taxpayer as a dividend. '5 Thus, the redemption proceeds after being taxed to the taxpayer as personal income
would be considered a donation to the Foundation."2 6 In rejecting the Commissioner's position, the Tax Court found ample evidence that an actual gift
had been made to the Foundation. Nor could the court in good conscience
classify the transaction as a sham.12 ' The court recognized the fact that the
taxpayer retained control over the policies of the college. However, the control of the affairs of the college are not tantamount to ownership considering
that the taxpayer had no rights to the profits. '
Essential to the court's favorable ruling to the taxpayer was the finding
that the Foundation was not bound to go through with the redemption at
the time it received the shares. The Tax Court noted that the transaction
would be taxable as a dividend to the donor-taxpayer if the donee is bound
by the corporation to surrender the shares for redemption.
11.04 Type A Reorganization - Continuity of Interest
Under Section 368 (a)"2 9 certain specifically defined transactions are
exempted from the regular rules which require gain or loss to be recognized
in the sale or exchange of property.3 0 In addition to the statutory requirements, one requirement that is imposed by the courts upon Type A reorganizations 3" is that the merger or consolidation must be such that the stockholders of the reorganizing corporations maintain a continuity of interest,
that is, that their investment must remain in the resulting corporation. ' For
example, if a shareholder's stock is exchanged for any combination of bonds,
cash or short term notes, the former shareholder has become a creditor and
has no continuity of interest. 3 '
42/d.
424 INT. REV. CODE of

1954, § 301.

425 62 T.C. at 690.
2

4 6ld.
427 Id.
428

at 691.

Id. at 694.

429INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a).
43
oSee Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b).
431 Type A reorganizations are statutory mergers and consolidations. See INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 368(a).
432See, e.g., Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1951);
Rocbling v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 810 (3rd Cir. 1944).

433See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d
382 (5th Cir. 1959).
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In First Federal Savings & Loan Association," ' a non-stock savings
and loan association entered into a merger agreement with a state chartered
stock savings and loan association. Under the agreement, the non-stock corporation acquired the common stock and savings deposits of the stock corporation, while the stockholders were given savings deposit accounts of the
non-stock corporation in return for their stock.
The IRS contended that there was no continuity of interest because the
stockholders gave up "pure equity" for the savings deposit accounts, which
were so liquid that they amounted to cash. The district court disagreed, finding
that a savings account is the only proprietary interest one can have in a nonstock savings and loan association. The test for continuity of interest was
whether there continued to be an acquired equity interest of substantially
the same amount as the stockholders originally controlled. The interest received did not have to be identical to that which was surrendered. Therefore,
since the savings accounts represented a definite and material equity interest
in the non-stock savings and loan association, the transaction qualified as a
Type A reorganization.
Section 337 Liquidation - Type C Reorganization
The Internal Revenue Service has recently approved in a letter ruling,"
a method whereby an owner of closely held corporate stock can exchange
his stock for shares in a mutual fund without incurring a tax liability. The
transaction involved a Section 337 liquidation ' and Type C reorgani37
zation.
11.05

The facts involved Corporation X which is engaged in business as a diversified open-end registration investment company, and Corporation Y, a
closely held corporation. Corporation Y has outstanding 853 shares of $100
par value common stock and thirty-six shares of 5% cumulative non-voting
preferred stock. The president of Corporation Y, A, owns approximately
11% of the outstanding common stock and 14% of the preferred stock.
Prior to entering into the proposed plan of reorganization, Corporation
Y intends to sell all of its assets to a newly formed corporation, Newco, in
exchange solely for cash. The purchase price established for Y's assets is
equal to the fair market value of the assets. The present business operations
of Y will continue to be conducted by Newco, with A owning 79% of the
outstanding shares of the new corporation.
After the sale of assets to Newco and pursuant to the reorganization
43478 U.S.T.C.
9398 (1978).
435 Letter Ruling 7825045, March 23, 1978.
36

4

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 337.

437 d. at § 368(a)(1)(c).
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plan, Corporation Y will transfer the cash proceeds of the sale of its assets
to Corporation X solely in exchange for shares of X voting stock. The shares
are to be valued by the net asset method as of the close of the New York
Stock Exchange on the date of the transfer.
Upon receipt of X shares, all or substantially all of the shares will be
distributed on a pro rata basis within one year to Y's shareholders in complete
liquidation of their stock interest in Y. Y is to sell a small portion of the Y
shares in order to raise funds for the payment of any liabilities or expenses
arising after the sale to Newco. Any excess cash not needed will be distributed to former Y shareholders. The reorganization plan provided, as required
by state law, that Y shareholders have dissenter rights. Y is responsible for
any amounts of money payable to dissenters.
A Section 337 liquidation occurs when a corporation adopts a plan of
complete liquidation in which all of its assets, except those retained to meet
the claims of creditors or possible contingent liabilities are distributed within
a twelve month period beginning on the date the plan is adopted. If successfully completed, a corporation adopting such a plan will not recognize a gain
or a loss on the distribution of its property. A Section 337 liquidation does not
apply unless there is distribution to shareholders. " 8
In the present fact situation, there is no problem with nonqualifying
assets and distributions such as stock in trade, inventory or installment obligations. ' However, it is worth noting that Section 337 (b) (2)"o makes an
exception for a bulk sale of substantially all the inventory to one person in
a single transaction. Another exception is installment obligations acquired
on a sale of property other than inventory or on a bulk sale of inventory
after adoption of the plan of liquidation. These obligations can be sold or
exchanged by the corporation under Section 337 (a), or distributed without
recognition of gain or loss under Sections 336 "1 and 453 (d) (4) (B)."'
Under Section 354 (a) (1),"1 no taxable income is received and no
deductible loss is sustained by a shareholder upon an exchange of stock and/
or securities if the following four conditions are fulfilled: 1) there is a reorganization as defined in the Internal Revenue Code; 2) the exchange is
effected pursuant to the plan of reorganization; 3) only stock or securities
or both are taken and given; 4) the stock or securities exchanged are issued
by a corporation which is a party to the reorganization. Under Section 368
Id. at § 337(a); Rev. Rul. 56-387, 1956-2 Ctm. BULL. 189.
,9 INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 337(b)(1) - (3).
438

"A0ld. at § 337(b)(2).
441 Id. at § 336.
2

" 1d. at § 453(d)(4)(B).
3

" 1d. at § 354(a)(1).
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(a) (1) (c),4" a Type C Reorganization involves one corporation acquiring
substantially all of the assets of another corporation solely in exchange for
its own voting stock or the voting stock of its parent corporation. A Type C
Reorganization is similar to a statutory merger but has the advantage of not
requiring strict compliance with state merger laws. ' The Service has utilized
a percentage of the assets test stating that for ruling purposes the "substantially all" requirements of Section 368 (a) ( 1 ) (c) is satisfied when a transfer
of assets represents at least 90% of the fair market value of net assets and
a minimum of 70% of the fair market value of gross assets held by the acquired corporation immediately preceding the transfer.4 6' The test should be
applied after the reduction of gross assets by liabilities." '
Upon the facts submitted, the Service ruled that the transaction would
qualify as a reorganization within the meaning of Section 368 (a) (1) (c).
In addition, no gain or loss would be recognized to Y on the transfer of its
assets to X in exchange for X common stock. No gain or loss would be recognized to the shareholders of Y upon the exchange of their shares of stock
in Y for shares of X common stock. As a result of the liquidation and reorganization, A was able to exchange his stock in Y for shares in X without
incurring any tax liability.
12.00 Subchapter S Corporations
12.01 Capital Gains - Section 337 Liquidation
Under Section 1373 (a)" undistributed taxable income of an electing
small business corporation will be included in the gross income of the shareholders in the manner set forth in Section 1373 (b) .44 However, pursuant to
Section 1378, ' ° if for a taxable year of an electing small business corporation
the net capital gain of such corporation exceeds $25,000 and exceeds 50%
of its taxable income for such year, and the taxable income of the corporation
for the year exceeds $25,000, there is imposed a tax on the income of the
corporation. The rationale of Section 1378 is to prevent a "pass-through" of
a large amount of capital gains to the shareholders by avoiding the capital
gains tax at the corporate level.
"4Id.
45

at § 368(a)(1)(c).
CooRD. 2d
22,315 (1978).

FED. TAx

440 Rev. Proc. 66-3, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 272.
44 Rev. Proc. 74-26, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 478.
+"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1373(a).
"

9

INT. REV. CODE

of 1954, § 1373(b). The Code requires each person who is a share-

holder of an electing small business corporation on the last day of the taxable year of the
corporation to include in gross income, for the taxable year in which or with which the
taxable year of the corporation ends, the amount the shareholder would have received as
a dividend, if on the last day there had been distributed pro rata to its shareholders by the
eorporation, an amount equal to the corporation's income for the taxable year.
450 TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1378.
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The IRS has recently held in Revenue Ruling 78-89"' that a Subchapter
S corporation may realize a capital gain in excess of $25,000 and distribute
it to its shareholders without a Section 1378 penalty if the distribution was
part of a complete liquidation."5 2 Therefore, the corporation would not have
a taxable capital gain, and the shareholders would be subject to capital gain
tax only to the extent that the amounts distributed to them in liquidation
exceeded their adjusted basis.

Rev. Ruling 78-89, 1978-1 CuM. BULL. 272.
4' A complete liquidation requires distribution of all assets to the shareholders within twelve
months of the adoption of the plan. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 337.
451
5

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979

51

